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NOTES AND COMMENT
the nature of such right, in the hands of future stockholders, from a
vested property to a defeasible property. If corporate management
needs more freedom of action in this direction the remedy lies with
the legislature and not with the courts.
LEo SALON.
LIMITATION OF THE PROHIBITION OF A STATE TO TAX THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
The right of a sovereign state to tax its subjects is universally
recognized. This right of taxation, where it exists, is necessarily
unlimited in its nature and thus carries with it the inherent power to
embarrass and destroy.' Both the state government and the federal
government possess this right of taxation, but their reciprocal rights
and immunities are safeguarded by the observance of two limitations
upon their respective powers of taxation: (1) that the exactions of
the one must not discriminate against the means and instrumentalities
of the other, and (2) that they must not burden the operation of that
other.2 As early as 1819 it was settled that a state cannot exercise
this right of taxation in respect to any of the instrumentalities which
the federal government may create for the performance of its consti-
tutional functions.3
The immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation
may be waived,4 wholly or with such limitations and qualifications as
may be deemed proper by the law-making power of the nation, but
the waiver must be clear and unambiguous.5 An officer of the
2McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
2 Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct.
495 (1937).
3 MR. C~n i JusncE MARsHArm in McCulloclh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819) said, "The sovereignty of a state extends to every-
thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but
does it extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into
execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States?
We think not. Those powers are given by the people of the United States, to a
government whose laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to
be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single state cannot confer a sover-
eignty which will extend over them." See also Farmers and Mechanics Sav-
ings Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354 (1914) ;
People ex rel. Donne-Hanna Coke Corp. v. Burk, 217 N. Y. Supp. 803, 128
Misc. 195 (1926), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 507, 162 N. E. 503 (1928); Appeal of
Van Dyke, 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (1935).
4 "A waiver is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known
right," Lehigh Val. R. R. v. Ins. Co., 172 Fed. 364, 97 C. C. A. 62 (1909);
"or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right',
Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 1923) ; "or is inconsistent with claiming
it", Marfield v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 111 Ohio St. 139, 144 N. E.
689 (1924).5 Austin v. Aldermen, 74 U. S. 694 (7 Wall.), 19 L. ed. 224 (1868).
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United States Government may not waive this immunity as such
waiver can only be made by an express congressional consent.6 Under
the fundamental principles of waiver, a waiver may be implied from
the silence of a party who has the power of waiving 7 under such cir-
cumstances as require him to speak.8  This is a deceptive silence
accompanied by an intention to defraud which amounts to a positive
beguilement.9 However, mere silence when one is not bound to
speak,10 where there is no occasion to speak:" and especially where
such silence is unaccompanied by any act calculated to mislead,'12 will
not constitute a waiver, in the absence of conduct amounting to an
estoppel.' 3 There can be no silent waiver by Congress in respect to
the imposition of state taxes on federal agencies for there is no duty
to speak nor to act on the part of Congress, in reference to such an
unlawful imposition.' 4
The rules in regard to immunity from state taxation have relaxed
somewhat in recent years and today a state tax on the income of a
federal employee or employee of a federal agency is no longer deemed
to be a burden on the government.' 5 A state may also tax the equip-
ment and materials of an independent contractor used in the perform-
ance of his contract with the federal government. An independent
contractor does a piece of work according to his own methods and
control without being subject to the control of his employer, being
reimbursed at a flat fee for his employment, notwithstanding any
addition or lessening of the cost of the work to be performed.' 6 Thus,
6 United States v. Wright, 53 F. (2d) 300 (1931), certiorari denied, 285
U. S. 539, 52 Sup. Ct. 312 (1932) ; Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609,
46 Sup. Ct 592 (1926).
7 Collission v. Wier, 91 Misc. 501, 154 N. Y. Supp. 951 (1915) ; People v.
Abetti, 152 N. Y. Supp. 890 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1914).
8 Jones v. Savin, 29 Del. 68, 96 Atl. 756 (1916).
9 Lord Const. Co. v. Edison Portland Cement Co., 234 N. Y. 411, 138
N. E. 39 (1923).
10 Barnard v. Megorden, 178 N. E. 868 (Ind. 1931) ; Lord Const. Co. v.
Edison Portland Cement Co., 234 N. Y. 411, 138 N. E. 39 (1923).
12 Solberg v. Sunburst Oil and Gas Co., 76 Mont. 254, 246 Pac. 168 (1926);
Crawford v. Winterbottom, 88 N. J. L. 588, 96 At. 497 (1916).
22 Northwestern Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 74 Mont. 142, 238
Pac. 594 (1925); Dale v. Continental Ins. Co., 95 Tenn. 38, 31 S. W. 266
(1895).
"3 Campbell Paint and Varnish Co. v. Hall, 131 Miss. 671, 95 So. 641
.(1923).
14 STONE, J., in Graves v. People ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup.
Ct. 598 (1939), "It is true that the silence of Congress when it has authority
to speak may sometimes give rise to an implication as to Congressional purpose.
The nature and extent of the implications depend upon the nature of the Con-
gressional power and the effect of its exercise. But there is little scope for the
application of that doctrine to the tax immunity of governmental agencies."
25 Congress must expressly exempt such employees, or their income may be
taxed by the state. Graves v. People ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup.
Ct. 598 (1939), overruling Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871).
28 Humpton v. Unterkircher, 97 Iowa 509, 66 N. W. 776 (1896) ; Pottorff
v. Fidelity Coal Mining Co., et al., 86 Kan. 774, 122 Pac. 120 (1912); Waters
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he must pay the sales taxes and other taxes imposed by the state, as
the charge is fixed before the work has begun and the tax is not
thereafter imposed upon the federal government, directly nor in-
directly.
In pursuance of its war effort, the United States Government has
been entering into what are designated as cost-plus fixed-fee con-
struction contracts with various firms. Under such contracts, the
federal government reimburses the contractor for all actual expendi-
tures in the performance of work, to be approved by the contracting
officer, in addition to the payment of the contractor's fixed fee. The
contracts also contain provisions to the effect that the contractor
should be reimbursed for payments made by him for Social Security
taxes and any applicable local or state taxes.17 It is to be noted that
this is not the express waiver necessary to the imposition of the local
or state taxes on agencies of the federal government, as they are not
only inapplicable, but are improper.
Under the contracts, the parties provide, as they may do,"' that
the materials bought by the builder shall become the property of the
government even before they have been actually affixed to the struc-
ture. "The government is to and does acquire title to the things
desired for its purposes. The contractors are not acting for them-
selves in buying the material though they are the named purchasers.
They have no power of disposition of the property other than to use
it within the project. They cannot use it as their own property but
as the property of the government which is to pay them the exact
amount which they pay or are obligated to pay. Their only interest
in the material is that its quality and amount be satisfactory to the
government." 10 They are thus brokers 20 or agents 21 of the federal
government in the transactions. As agents of the federal govern-
v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 52 Minn. 474, 55 N. W. 52 (1893); Powell v. Virginia
Const. Co., 88 Tenn. 692, 13 S. W. 691 (1890) ; Stricker v. Industrial Comm. of
Utah, 55 Utah 603, 188 Pac. 849 (1920).
3 7 King and Boozer v. State, 3 So. (2d) 572 (Ala. 1941).
1S Duylan Silk Co. v. Spiner, 53 C. C. A. 321, 115 Fed. 689 (1902);
Morgan v. Goddard, 239 Mich. 174, 214 N. W. 155 (1927).
19 LINGSTON, J., in King and Boozer v. State, 3 So. (2d) 572 (Ala. 1941).
20 "A broker is one who is engaged for others on a commission basis to
negotiate contracts relative to property". Messick v. Johnson, 115 Okla. 139,
8 P. (2d) 28 (1931) ; Rodman v. Manning, 55 Ore. 336, 99 Pac. 657 (1909) ;
Gile v. Tsutskawa, 109 Wash. 366, 187 Pac. 323 (1920); DAvis, J., in Lam-
precht v. State, 84 Ohio St. 32, 95 N. E. 65 (1911), "A broker has the right to
take title to the property in his own name where he advances the purchase
money but ordinarily such vests in the customer subject to the broker's lien for
advances and commissions whether it is purchased in the broker's name or not"
21 "Every broker is in a sense an agent although every agent is not a
broker". Stratford v. City Council of Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619, 20 So. 127(1895); Gay v. Lavina State Bank, 61 Mont. 449, 202 Pac. 753 (1921);
SEARLs, J., in Ayres v. Thomas, 176 Cal. 140, 47 Pac. 1013 (1897), "All brokers
are agents and there are certain well defined principles of law applicable to
them as such and as to the different classes certain other principles are appli-
cable dependent upon the peculiarities of the class."
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ment, the contracting companies should be exempted from state legis-
lation, so far as that legislation may interfere with or impair their
efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to
serve that government. 22 It has been held that a contractor supply-
ing a military post with provisions cannot be restrained from making
purchases within any state, or from transporting the provisions to
the place at which the troops were stationed, nor could he be fined or
taxed for doing so.
2 3
A construction company in pursuing such a contract with the
United States Government, authorized a sub-contractor to procure
lumber for them, to be used in the construction of army barracks at
Ft. McClellan, Alabama. The State of Alabama sought to impose a
sales tax 24 upon the lumber procured by the authorized sub-contrac-
tor. Under the terms of the contract and in the light of the tax's true
designation as a consumer's tax,25 the burden of payment ultimately
fell upon the federal government. The court in a prior case had held
the state could not tax such a contractor furnishing materials for the
army 2 6 But the Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing
the state court of Alabama,2 7 held the sub-contractor liable.28  Thus,
in this limitation on the prohibition of a state to tax the agencies of
the federal government, millions of dollars which could normally be
used in the furtherance of arms manufacturing is diverted to the
coffers of the states' treasuries.
The agencies of the federal government are subject to a great
impairment, due to the findings 29 of the Supreme Court which
22 MR. Jusicz MILER in First National Bank of Louisville v. Comnon-
wealth of Kentucky said, "Any other rule would convert a principle founded
alone in the necessity of securing to the government of the United States the
means of exercising its legitimate powers."
23 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (U. S.
1824) ; reiterated in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct 16 (1920).
24 ALABAMA SALEs TAX AcT, General Acts 1939, p. 16, Code 1940, tit. 51,
§§ 752-783, 785, 786.
25 "The tax sought to be imposed is designated as a privilege or license
tax levied upon every person engaged in the business of selling tangible per-
sonal property at retail determined by a stated percentage of the gross proceeds
of sale, GENERAL AcT No. 18, General Acts of Alabama of 1939, § II, but it is
made unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to add to the sales price and
collect from the purchaser the amount due on the tax, GENERAL AcT No. 18,
General Acts of Alabama of 1939, § XXVI." LiwNGSTON, J., in King and
Boozer v. State, 30 So. (2d) 572 (Ala. 1941) ; see also Steward Dry Goods Co.
v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 55 Sup. Ct. 525 (1935) ; Lawrence v. State Tax Com-
mission, 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct 556 (1932) ; National Linen Service Corp.
v. State Tax Commission, 237 Ala. 360, 186 So. 478 (1939) ; Long v. Roberts
and Son, 234 Ala. 570, 176 So. 213 (1937).
26 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (U. S.
1824); reiterated in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct. 16 (1920).
27 King and Boozer v. State, 3 So. (2d) 572 (Ala. 1941.)
28 State of Alabama v. King and Boozer, et al., 314 U. S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct 43
(1941).
29 Curry v. United States, et al., 314 U. S. 14, 62 Sup. Ct. 48 (1941), which
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allowed the state to do indirectly what it could not do directly.3 0 In
ordinary times, the ruling of the Supreme Court would, perhaps, be
a fair furtherance of the great trend towards limiting the government's
immunity from state taxation.31 But in view of the national emer-
gency, it is believed that the immunity should be stabilized, for the
duration of the war, thus enabling the government to get, on its
armament appropriations, the 100 per cent return which is so neces-
sary to ultimate victory. Immediate passage of the Cochrane Bill,
which is now before Congress, or one drawn along similar lines, which
will prohibit the states taxing federal war expenditures, is vital, in
order to counteract the effect of the decision handed down by the
Supreme Court which was so injurious to the national war effort.
ARTHUR MARCHIANO.
followed the rule laid down in State of Alabama v. King and Boozer, et al.,
314 U. S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (1941).80 "And of course the taxation may not be accomplished by indirection".
Miller v. City of Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280 (1927).
81 Graves v. People ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 598 (1939),
overruling Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (U. S. 1871).
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